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Abstract: In many situations, a group of individuals (called agents) must collectively decide on one of
several alternatives, e.g., elect the next president. Ordinal mechanisms are systematic procedures to make
such decisions based on the agents’ preference orders over the alternatives. A mechanism is strategyproof
if it makes truthful reporting of preferences a dominant strategy. Strategyproofness is therefore the “gold
standard” among the incentive concepts. However, the seminal impossibility result of Gibbard [1977]
showed that strategyproofness also greatly restricts the design space of ordinal mechanisms even if they
can use randomization. In particular, it is incompatible with many other common desiderata, such as
Condorcet consistency, stability, or egalitarian fairness. Thus, trade-offs between strategyproofness and
other desiderata are necessary. In this paper, we study these trade-offs. We use approximate strate-
gyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to quantify the incentive properties of non-strategyproof
mechanisms, and we introduce deficit, a measure to quantify the performance of mechanisms with respect
to another desideratum. A mechanism that minimizes the deficit subject to a particular bound on manip-
ulability is called optimal at this bound; and the mechanisms that are optimal at some bound form the
Pareto frontier. Our main contribution is a structural characterization of this Pareto frontier: we show
that there exists a finite set of supporting manipulability bounds, such that it suffices to identify optimal
mechanisms at each of them. Other mechanisms along the Pareto frontier can then be constructed as
hybrids (i.e., convex combinations) of these optimal mechanisms. This allows a concise representation of
the Pareto frontier in terms of a finite number of optimal mechanisms and their hybrids. In combination
with linear programming, we can exploit this characterization to compute the whole Pareto frontier algo-
rithmically. To illustrate its shape, we apply our results to determine the Pareto frontier for two different
desiderata, namely Plurality and Veto scoring, in settings with 3 alternatives and up to 18 agents.
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In many situations, a group of individuals (called agents) must collectively decide
on one of several alternatives, e.g., elect the next president. Ordinal mechanisms are
systematic procedures to make such decisions based on the agents’ preference orders
over the alternatives. A mechanism is strategyproof if it makes truthful reporting of
preferences a dominant strategy. Strategyproofness is therefore the “gold standard”
among the incentive concepts. However, the seminal impossibility result of Gibbard
[1977] showed that strategyproofness also greatly restricts the design space of ordinal
mechanisms even if they can use randomization. In particular, it is incompatible with
many other common desiderata, such as Condorcet consistency, stability, or egalitarian
fairness. Thus, trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata are necessary.
In this paper, we study these trade-offs. We use approximate strategyproofness to de-
fine manipulability, a measure to quantify the incentive properties of non-strategyproof
mechanisms, and we introduce deficit, a measure to quantify the performance of mecha-
nisms with respect to another desideratum. A mechanism that minimizes the deficit
subject to a particular bound on manipulability is called optimal at this bound; and
the mechanisms that are optimal at some bound form the Pareto frontier. Our main
contribution is a structural characterization of this Pareto frontier: we show that there
exists a finite set of supporting manipulability bounds, such that it suffices to identify
optimal mechanisms at each of them. Other mechanisms along the Pareto frontier can
then be constructed as hybrids (i.e., convex combinations) of these optimal mechanisms.
This allows a concise representation of the Pareto frontier in terms of a finite number
of optimal mechanisms and their hybrids. In combination with linear programming, we
can exploit this characterization to compute the whole Pareto frontier algorithmically.
To illustrate its shape, we apply our results to determine the Pareto frontier for two
different desiderata, namely Plurality and Veto scoring, in settings with 3 alternatives
and up to 18 agents.
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